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of the man of culture, looking with sympathetic eye upon the progress of democracy; it is hardly that of those engaged most intimately in the struggles.

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L'IDÉAL MODERNE. La question morale. La question sociale. La question religieuse. Par Paul Gaultier. Paris: Hachette et Cie., 1908. Pp. 358.

It is generally admitted by Frenchmen that their country is morally in a pretty 'bad way.' Occasionally this is vigorously denied, as President Jordan can testify; but the most vigorous denial does not change the facts. What the French themselves think of the conditions can be best learned from a perusal of the books and the numerous periodicals that have appeared within the last two decades dealing with the general problem of public morality. Professor Fouillée in his "Psychologie du peuple français" admits that his country has been rapidly losing prestige, but he finds some consolation in the circumstance that the decreasing birth-rate to which attention has so often been called, is not confined to France. M. Gaultier tells his readers that whether we rejoice or grieve, the fact is patent that the contemporary conscience is rapidly losing its moorings and that morality in conduct is becoming a thing of the past. Hence there has come into existence an abundant literature the aim of which is to establish a system of morals outside of metaphysics and of every creed. He asks what we are to think of these efforts. Is it possible to establish a system of morals without God and without a revelation? How can biology explain the duty of self-sacrifice, which has influenced and continues to influence the actions of many men? He does not believe with the sociologists that an act is criminal because it hurts the social conscience, but that it hurts the social conscience because it is criminal. There is some truth in the contention of the sociologists, but it is not the whole truth. It is the mission of history to explain; it cannot discover motives except in so far as they are expressed in acts. Morality cannot be interpreted by a study of the social group alone, independent of the personal, the psychic, and, consequently, the rational factor. Mo-

ality is not a matter of convention having no roots in our moral nature. If men were not born with an innate moral germ, it could not be developed by any *milieu* however favorable.

Science cannot construct a system of morals, because it is concerned with externals only, whereas morality is internal, psychical, the work and the object of consciousness. The physician who tells his patient how to get well does not tell him that he is under obligations to get well. There are no longer any moral problems that are not also physical and physiological. Morality acts; science observes and investigates. A science cannot become moral without losing its character as science, and morals can become scientific only on the condition of ceasing to be moral. Science knows nothing of ends. Morality is a fact given in the experience of mankind, anterior to all systems; it precedes the science of which it constitutes the object. To say that manners and customs generate morals is to put the effect for the cause; it makes of men mere passive entities, products of a force which they do not understand and of which they are but dimly conscious, if at all. The end of nature is neither pleasure nor happiness, but perfection, the complete accomplishment of its functions. By virtue of the power men have to reflect and to transform their reflections into deeds, each one of us is invited to realize perfection by the ideal which is present to his mind before he acts. The moral law cannot be deduced solely from the study of conditions because it is innate. The study of conditions, however, helps us to formulate the rules more clearly. They are the test of practice. The most important of all sciences is the science of ethics. From it all the other sciences borrow their right to exist and in a measure their necessity. The real creator in morals is not the philosopher, but the saint. The moral ideal does not proceed out of practice nor is it developed by practice, but is designed to enter into it. A Socrates, a Jesus were content to live their thoughts.

The certitude with which ethics deals is neither sensuous nor logical; it is moral. It rests neither on rational evidence nor on the evidence of the senses; it is purely internal. It is only by doing our duty that we learn to believe in duty. Morality rests not only on a psychic reality, but also on a physiological, a social, and therefore on a cosmic physical reality. Science often teaches us what is moral, but only the ethical consciousness impels us to do it. Science demonstrates the harm that comes from

the use of alcohol, but it is the science of ethics that makes clear to us the obligation to abstain from its use ourselves and also to endeavor to keep others from using it. Science furnishes the positive and firm foundation on which rest a great number of the applications of the principles of morality. The Christian ideal is the law of sacrifice only because it is the law of life. It is a profound truth that he who loses his own life finds it a hundredfold. The ultimate unit in the world is not the social unit, but the individual, the person. Society rests on the individual, not the individual on society. It is not society that gives us the consciousness of our existence. "I think, therefore I am," not because somebody else is, but because I am conscious of my own existence. It is not because man is a social being that he is a conscious entity; it is because he is conscious and reasonable that he is eminently social. Whence comes progress if it is not due to innumerable individual contributions? Science advances solely by the accumulation of the labors of individuals. History is nothing more than a tissue of personal deeds. Individualism is neither particularism nor egoism. The latter is a radical vice which seeks to get as much as possible and to give as little as possible. He who considers himself the center of the world and the world as his property is the farthest possible remove from a moral man. Coöperation, in order to be efficient, must be free. What does the coöperation of a troop of mercenaries or of a gang of galley-slaves amount to? He who would be greatest among you will be your servant, but his service will be voluntary service. Morality is individual not only in its principles, but in its prescriptions also. Morality while commanding us to consecrate ourselves to others, bids us also to develop ourselves. What is the highest perfection if it is not an invitation to the most complete felicity? The salvation of society depends on individualism properly understood. The social question is not a question of morals, because the latter is a thing apart. Socrates taught that there are unwritten laws higher than statutes. So did Antigone. Juvenal assures us that it is sometimes necessary for us to lose our lives in order to establish a reason for living. If moral laws are engendered by society, it can also change them; what is moral to-day may be immoral to-morrow.

Religion leads us to morality, and morality postulates a supreme Being who is the source of all existence and of all perfec-

tion. Morality does not lead us to God as a mere abstraction, but as a perfect ideal in which are reflected and embodied our highest aspirations. On the other hand, religion is the ferment of morality. It is the completion, not only of morality, but of life in its entirety. The true religious sentiment is implicit in morality, not only as a means but also as an end. If it leads to fanaticism, it is because there is a lack of equilibrium in the faculties of the fanatic. Religion does not merely sustain morality: it gives to life a meaning and a value which nothing else can give. Religion does not teach us to regard the world as of slight moment; just the reverse. It provides us with many reasons for exalting, for admiring the world. Religion discerns a meaning in progress: it would have none if it could not be continued indefinitely. Religion gives to ethics the assurance that the reign of ends is capable of realization; that it will one day be realized. There is nothing in science which should lead us to believe that faith is not an instrument of cognition, a method of getting into communication with reality of a different kind, or rather with another phase of reality than that which is the object of the savant's investigation.

Metaphysics and theology can very well coexist by the side of experimental science. Religion, philosophy, and science are three modes of solving the same problem. The references to the scientific order which the Scriptures contain, are nothing more than envelopes of moral, metaphysical, and religious truths, which believers held to be revelations from God. If inspiration is a fact, it is not only a physical, but a supernatural reality, which the moral and religious consciousness can discern, which, however, does not fall under the observation of the historian. It is in this light that the stories of Noah, of Jonah, and others are to be understood. The Bible is in no sense a manual of chronology. To regard it as a historical work in the ordinary sense of the term is unjust both to history and to the Bible. History is not mere fact; it is also interpretation. This statement is true not only of profane but also of biblical history.

The book is a strong one. The author is probably a Roman Catholic; but his creed is very little in evidence. His position with regard to the independence of morality is as nearly impregnable as it can be made, it seems to me. Whether his apologetic attitude is to be commended is not easy to determine. To judge from the recently expressed views of the papal

hierarchy on matters scientific it is very doubtful if M. Gaultier's method of defense will be found acceptable.

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MORAL EDUCATION IN EIGHTEEN COUNTRIES. Report on Moral Instruction (General and Denominational) and on Moral Training. By Gustav Spiller. London: Watts & Co., 1909. Pp. xv, 362.

There is sure to be a ready welcome for this book on Moral Instruction by Mr. Gustav Spiller, who is well known, not only as an author, but also as one whose untiring energy and able organization made the International Congress on Moral Instruction possible. In the preface Mr. Spiller states that the present work was prepared in answer to the need of a volume describing what is being done in respect of moral education all over the world. The second part of the book is accordingly devoted to a report on moral training in the schools of Austria, Belgium, the British Empire, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. Nine countries had already been reported upon in "Moral Instruction and Training in Schools," edited by Mr. Sadler, and concerning these the present volume has not added much to the information given in the earlier work. Its importance lies in the valuable accounts of countries which were not treated by Mr. Sadler and his coöperators. Nevertheless one cannot help feeling that more interest and comment will be directed to Part I which, in 86 pages, gives a statement of many of the most controversial points which have arisen in connection with moral education. Mr. Spiller very emphatically states his opinion concerning religious and moral education, and perhaps what he has to say would have been more fruitful had it been possible to combine his admirable sincerity with greater reticence, in particular, had the criticisms of the ethical value of certain religious convictions been omitted. In his Presidential Address to the Moral Instruction League in February last, Professor Mackenzie also argued the possibility of teaching morality without reference to religion, but his masterly discussion could cause no offense